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is admissible under some principle and that it is safe to admit it as part of the
res gestae. Every principle included within the term res gestae is recogmzed by
the Court as a separate principle of evidence. Therefore, it is apparent that the
use of the term res gestae is unncessary.
From the foregoing it would seem obvious that the most desirable course
,of action on the part of the Court would be the abandonment of the term res
gestae, and substituting therefor those separate exceptions to the hearsay rule that
have been pointed out as comprising the general term. The least that should
be done is that the Court should verbalize a recognition of a definition of
res gestae as being a categorical term including the five separate exceptions to
the hearsay rule which have been discussed herein; namely;
1. Verbal act
2. Spontaneous exclamation
3. Circumstantial evidence
4. Mental or physical condition
5. Admissions made by agent
HOLLIS E. EDn1MS

PARTIALLY DISCLOSED AGENCY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
One of the purposes of this note is to deternmne when and to what extent
the distinction between "undisclosed" agency and "partially disclosed" agency is
material in the actual determination of the legal rights and liabilities of principal,
agent and third party. Another purpose is to discuss the duties of the parties as
to disclosure of, and inquiry into, the agency relationship, and determine the consequences of the failure to carry out these duties. A brief discussion also will be
devoted to the theories behind the duties of the parties and the soundness of
these theories in the light of their application.
I. DEFINITION OF TERMS AS USED IN Tins ARTICLE.
A. Agency. A relationship between one party (the agent) and another party
tthe principal), the purpose of which is to create, modify, terminate and otherwise affect contractual relations between the principal and third persons.
B. Fully Disclosed Agency. The relationship where the fact of agency and
the identity of the principal are known by both the agent and the third party.
C. Partially Disclosed Agency. The relationship where the fact of agency is
known by both the agent and the third party, but the name of the principal is
unknown by the third party.
D. Undisclosed Agency. The relationship where the fact of agency is unknown to the third party.
II. LIABILITY OF THE PiNtcIPAL OR AGENT.
One who deals with a fully disclosed agent must normally look only
principal for legal responsibility in matters arising out of such dealings,
absence of any open pledge of the agent's credit.' This rule is basic m the
agency. Furthermore, where the relation of principal and agent legally

to the
in the
law of
exists,

'Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 392, 396, 25 L. Ed. 1050 (1879); See Gordon
v. Brinton, 55 Wash. 568, 104 Pac. 832, 833 (1909). Throughout this note, cases
where agent acts in excess of his authority are excluded.
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although undisclosed, the principal may be held liable because it is as much his
contract as if the agency were fully disclosed, although here the agent may be
held alternatively if the third party so elects.' For purposes of exempting the
agent from liability to the third party, the disclosure of the agency must include
the identity of the principal.' In other words, the agency must be fully disclosed
at the time of the transaction if the agent is to be free of liability.'
It is not within the scope of this article to discuss what constitutes an election
by the third party,' but generally, "It is only after discovery of the principal and
opportunity to make a deliberate and intelligent choice that the third party is in
a position to elect."' An election, made with full knowledge of the circumstances
of the case and with freedom of choice, is irrevocable.' In the majority of juns-Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N.Y. 625, 23 N. E. 24, (1889). See Baldwin v.
Garrett, 111 Ga. 376, 36 S.E. 966 (1900), construing a code section, held that
where one dealt with an agent who failed to disclose his principal his right to
proceed against the principal was not dependent on the diligence used in discovering the fact of the concealed agency.
In Ballister v. Hamilton, 3 La. Anno. 401 (1848), the Court said: "Mere
knowledge that there is a principal, does not destroy the right of a party dealing
"
with the agent to look to the principal when afterwards discovered.
'Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass. 178, 180 (1780), which case was approved in
Weil v. Raymond, 142 Mass. 206, 7 N.E. 860, 865 (1886), but was disposed of
on other grounds. See Banjo v. Wacker, 251 S.W 456, 458 (Mo. 1923).
'Argersinger v. MacNaughton, 114 N.Y. 535, 21 N. E. 1022, 1023 (1889).
See Gordon v. Brnton, 55 Wash. 568, 104 Pac. 832, 833 (1909).
'In Mercer v. Leihy, 139 Mich. 447, 452, 102 N.W 972, 974 (1905), the
Court said: "The question here seems to be whether anything less than a disclosure
of the name of the principal is sufficient, and a number of authorities are cited
which use language to the effect that disclosure of the name of the principal is
essential.
"We are of the opinion that the statement, frequently found, that the agent,
to avoid personal liability, must disclose the name of Is principal, is due to the
fact that such is, in the nature of tungs, the natural and ordinary, and many times
the only convenient and practicable, way of identifying um. The important
information to be given to the purchaser is that the auctioneer is an agent, acting
for a principal whom he discloses, and it would seem that the accurate giving of
Is principal's name is not indispensable where other means of clearly pointing out
"'
and identifying him are adopted.
In Falk v. Wolfsohn, 7 Misc. 314, 27 N.Y.S. 903 (1894), it was pointed out
that if the third party knows the principal, although he did not learn of him
through the agent, the knowledge is still sufficient to relieve the agent of liability.
In Royce v. Allen, 28 Vt. 284, 236 (1856), the Court said: "The law upon
this subject is well established, that, in simple contracts, if the agent does not disclose his agency, and name his principal, he binds umself, and is subject to all
liabilities, express or implied, created by the contract, in the same manner as if he
"
were the principal in interest.
In Alexander Lumber Co. v. McGeehan, 124 Wis. 325, 102 N.W 571 (1905),
the Court, in referrng to the case of Royce v. Allen, supra, and approving the rule
as quoted in that case, said: "That is a correct statement, but like most general rules
it is not entirely without exceptions. The general statement should not be construed as requiring the agent under all circumstances to expressly declare Is
agency and the name of his principal-to do so regardless of whether the person
dealing with him knows the facts, or is chargeable with knowledge thereof from
circumstances brought to Is attention.
'A discussion of an election is not a subject of tus article. For an excellent
selection of cases and a discussion on this entire subject, see 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 786.
2 Am. Jut. 315.
'E. J. Codd Co. v. Parker, 97 Md. 319, 55 A. 628, 624 (1903); Weil v. Raymond, 142 Mass. 206, 7 N.E. 860, 865 (1886); Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass. 178,
180 (1870).
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dictions, it becomes the duty of the third party to elect within a reasonable time
after discovery of the principal, and a failure to do so will result in the principal
being released from all liability.9 Presumably, this is based on the theory that
since the third party contracted with the agent thinking the agent was the real
party in interest, and could, if he so elected, hold the agent solely liable, then if
he fails to elect within a reasonable time after discovery of the true principal, it
is a reasonable deduction that he desires to continue to look to the agent.
Is there a duty on the agent to disclose the fact of agency and the name of
his principal, or, is there a duty on the third party to inquire to determine if he
is dealing with an agent? Standing alone, this question cannot be answered
categorically It is well settled, however, that if the agent is to escape personal
liability, the duty is on him to disclose, not only the fact of agency but the
identity of Is principal,"0 and the courts consistently hold that there is no duty on
the third party to inquire to determine if he is dealing with an agent," and, apparently, no duty to inquire as to the identity of the principal where the agency
9
Smethurst v. Mitchell, 1 El. & El. 622, 102 E.C.L. 622, 120 Eng. Rep. 1048
(1859); approved in Curtis v. Williamson, L. R. 10 Q.B. 57, 59 (1874).
See
James v. Bixby, 11 Mass. 34 39 (1814). In 1 AMERICAN AND ENGLIsH ENCYCLOPED
oF LAw, Second Ed., 1189, it is stated: "The principal will be released from
all liability if the right of election is not exercised by the other party witlun a
reasonable time after such principal is discovered."
"0 Horan v. Hughes, 129 Fed. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1903); affirmed in 129 Fed.
1005 (C.C.A. 2d 1905); Murphy v. Hilmnch, 66 Calif. 69, 4 Pac. 958, 959
(1884); Frederick Raff Co. v. Goeben, 116 Conn. 83, 163 A. 462, 463 (1932);
Kelly v. Guess, 157 Miss. 157, 127 So. 274, 276 (1929). See Banjo v. Wacker, 251
S.W 456, 458 (Mo. 1923); Cockran v. Rice, 26 S.D. 893, 398, 128 N.W 583,
585 (1910).
" Frederick Raff Co. v. Goeben, 116 Conn. 83, 163 A. 462, 463 (1932); Fritz
v. Kennedy, 119 Iowa 628, 93 N.W 603, 604 (1903).
In Raymond v. Crown
Mills, 2 Mete. (Mass. 1841) 319, 324, the Court said: "But it was contended, that
if the plaintiffs had, at the time of the sale, the means of knowing that the goods
were purchased on account of the defendants and for their benefit, and yet debited
them to the account of Rogerson, this should bar the claim of the plaintiffs against
the defendants, although they had no actual knowledge who the principal was.
Such a prnciple as is suggested would present great practical difficulties in its application, and might do great injustice. The question at once arises, to what extent
are means of knowledge to exist, to justify its application? Is it necessary that
the vendor should avail himself
of every possible means to learn whether the individual he is dealing with be prncipal or agent? If so, the mere neglect by the
vendor to inquire of the person with whom he was actually dealing, whether he
in
cases,
not usingorthe
means
of ifknowledge
wasmost
acting
as pncipal
hand. We
do not
agent,
and
agent, thewhich
name were
of theatprncipal,
would
be,
understand the rule to be applied with this stnetuess; but that, on the contrry,
there must be actual knowledge, on the part of the vendor, of the relation of the
parties, and their interest in the matter, to exonerate the pnrncpal by gicng the
credit to the agent. If, with such knowledge, the vendor chooses to ghve credit
to the agent auss
debtor, he discharges the iabiity of the prncipal. It is not
however enough that there might exnst circumstances, that would, i the minds of
some men, have awakened susimeons and led to further nqures. Nor is it
enough (if we adopt the deliod i the case of Thomson v. Davenport, 9 Barn. &
Cres. 78), to exonerate an unknown princpal, that the agent declared, at the time
of the sale, that he was dealing for another, f he did not disclose the name of his
prndipal. That case, while it fully recogmzes the general rule already statedthat f one, knowing the name of the principal, elects to credit the agent, he cannot afterwards resort to the principal-demes its application to cases where the

name of the principal was unknown, although the fact of agency of the one dealing
with him was disclosed, and the vendor must have been appnzed that another
party might be made the debtor."
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is partially disclosed.' But it should be pointed out that it is only in a situation
where the third party is seeking redress that the duty of the agent to disclose becomes significant. This will be pointed out in the discussion to follow.
Summary: Where the third party is seeking redress:
(1) If at the time of the transaction the agency was undisclosed or only
partially disclosed, the tird party may hold the agent liable, or, upon discovery
of the principal, may elect to hold either the principal or agent liable.
(2) After discovery of the pnncipal, the third party must make his election
within a reasonable time, or the pnncipal will be relieved of all liability.
(8) The duty is on the agent to disclose the fact of agency and the name
of his pnncipal, and not on the third party to inquire.
(4) For purposes of relieving the agent of personal liability, the disclosure
of the agency must include the name of the principal; hence for this purpose
there is no distinction between a partially disclosed and an undisclosed agency.
LIABILITY OF THE TnmD PARTY.
Having concluded that a third party may, on discovery of the true principal,
hold the principal liable on the contract, it follows, and the courts are unanimous
in holding, that the undisclosed principal may appear at any time in his true
character and claim the benefits of the contract.' However, the principal can
enforce the contract only to the extent that his doing so does not prejudice the
rights of the third party. In other words, if in dealing with the agent the third
party thought he was dealing with the real party in interest, then, when the pnncipal appears and sues on the contract the third party may ordinarily set up any
defense or set-off which he could have set up against the agent had the agent
been suing as principal.' The cases have given two theories for tls rule. (1) The
III.

See Estes v. Jones, 119 Miss. 142, 80 So. 526, 528 (1919); Johnston v. Farrott, 92 Mo. App. 199, 204 (1902); 2 C.J. 817.
' Nelson v. Andrews, 19 Misc. (N.Y.) 623, 44 N.Y.S. 384 (1897); Rollins v.
Phelps, 5 Minn. 878, 878 (Gilf. 1860-1861). See Mills v. Hunt, 20 Wend. 481,
438 (N.Y. 1838).
"2Ford v. Williams, 21 How. (U.S.) 287, 289, 16 L. Ed. 36, 38 (1858); Bell
Grocery Co. v. Letts-Fletcher Co., 211 Ky. 147, 149, 277 S.W 295 (1925). The
reason for the rule is set out in Sullivan v. Shailor, 70 Conn. 733, 736, 40 A. 1054,
1055 (1898), wherein the Court said: "But, as the reason of the rule which permits the pnnciDal to sue in such cases in his own name is that he is entitled to the
ultinate eneft of the contract made by Is agent, so, in seeking to recover that
benefit, lie must assume the position of the agent whose contract he is enforcing,
and the action so instituted by him is open to the defenses which might have been
interposed to a suit commenced by the agent at the time the principle first sought
to enforce the contract."
In Barry v. Page, 10 Gray 398, 399 Mass. (1858), the Court said: "As the
contract of an agent is in law the contract of the principal, the latter may come
forward and sue thereon, although at the time the contract was made the agent
acted as and appeared to be the principal.
"Ford v. Williams, 21 How. (U.S.) 287, 289, 16 L. Ed. 36, 38 (1858); Bell
Grocery Co. v. Letts-Fletcher Co., 211 Ky. 147, 149, 277 S.W 295 (1925). In
Barry v. Page, 10 Gray 398, 399 (Mass. 1858), in qualifying the rule with respect
to the prncipal's appeanng and claiming the benefits of the contract, the Court
stated: "There is a qualification of the rule, by which it is held that when a contract has been made for an undisclosed principal, who permits Ins agent to act
as apparent principal in the transaction, the right of the former to intervene and
bring suit in his own name is not allowed in any way to affect or impair the right
of the other contracting party, but he will in such case be let in to all the equities,
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principal permitted his agent to practice deception on the third party, and the loss
should fall upon the party whose conduct made the deception possible. This
theory is based upon the idea that it would be unjust to put the third party in a
worse over-all position by withholding the true facts from him, than he would
have been in had the facts actually been as he was led to believe them to be.
(2) The principal must take the contract as he finds it; he must assume the
burdens of the contract as well as its advantages.' The application of the second
theory is somewhat broader than the theory itself. For instance, it it a reasonable
inference, on the basis of the second theory, that the rule would apply only to
those defenses or set-offs that are connected with the contract which the undisclosed principal is attempting to enforce. However, this is not at all true. The
cases hold that the third party may set up any defense or set-off which existed
in his favor against the agent at any time prior to the action by the principal,
whether connected with that particular contract or not.0
It is well settled that the third party cannot avail himself of any separate
defense or set-off which he might have against the agent, where he knew of the
agency at the time the contract was entered into, even though the agency was
but partially disclosed.'7 Moreover, even m a case of undisclosed agency if by
virtue of the nature of the transaction the third party was put on inquiry as to
the fact of agency and with reasonable diligence could have learned of the agency,
defenses and set-offs against the agent are not available to the third party in a
suit by the principal against the third party'
It follows that for purposes of
depriving the third party of the use of such defenses and set-offs, notice need not
extend to the name of the principal. Contrary to the situation where the third
party is seeking redress, the responsibility is not upon the agent to disclose the
fact of agency, but the third party is under a duty to inquire, if he is to avail himself of such defenses and set-offs against the principal.
Summanj: Where the principal is seeking redress:
(1) The principal, even though undisclosed, may appear at any time in
his true character and claim the benefits of the contract.
(2) Where the agency was undisclosed, the third party may set up against
the principal any defense or set-off which he could have set up against the agent
had the agent been suing as principal.
(8) Where the agency was only partially disclosed, the third party may set
up against the principal only such defenses and set-offs as arise out of the
particular contract, or as he may have against the principal otherwise.
(4) If the facts within the tlurd party s knowledge are such as would lead
a person of ordinary prudence to believe he was dealing with an agent, a duty
arises on the third party to inquire to determine if he is dealing with an agent
If he fails to inquire, and it later develops that he dealt with an agent, the deset-offs and other defences to which he would have been entitled, if the action had
been brought in the name of the agent."
See Frazier v. Poindexter, 78 Ark. 241, -95 S.W 464, 466 (1906).
"Hooke v. Crowe, 100 Me. 399, 61 A. 1080 (1905); Traub v. Milliken, 57
Me. 63, 66 (1869).
"' See Munroe v. Adamo, 136 Ky. 252, 124 S.W 296 (1910); and Winslow
Bros. & Co. v. Staton, 150 N.C. 264, 63 S.E. 950, 951 (1909).
" Whelan v. McCreary, 64 Ala. 319, 326 (1879).
'Frazier v. Poindexter, 78 Ark. 241, 95 S.W 464, 466 (1906); Miller v. Lea.
35 Md. 396, 407 (1872); McLacblin v. Brett, 34 Hun. (N.Y. 1885) 478, 481.
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Lenses and equities existing between him and the agent are, nevertheless, cut off,
except, of course, that the third party may always use defenses and set-offs arising
out of the particular contract itself.
IV

WHEN SHOULD THE AGENCY BE DISCLOSED?

A. Protecting the Interests of the Agent. It would always be in the interest
of the agent to disclose fully the agency, since a failure to do so might result in
an election by the third party to hold the agent liable. If the agent is to avoid
liability, the disclosure of the agency must include the principal's name.
B. Protectingthe Interests of the Principal. Of course, the principal is liable
on his contract whether the agency be disclosed or undisclosed. Therefore, insofar as liability of the principal is concerned, disclosure is of little significance. It
has been suggested, however, that nondisclosure of the agency serves to enhance
the interests of the principal to the extent that the third party may elect to hold
the agent solely liable. On the other hand, for purposes of cutting off the defenses
and equities which the third party may have against the agent, and could otherwise set up against the pnncipal, it is to the principal's interests that the agency
be disclosed. It is submitted that the interests of the principal will be better served
by the latter course than they would be by a nondisclosure of the agency because
it is of more importance to cut off the defenses and equities existing between the
agent and third party, since in an overwhelming majority of instances the third
party will elect to hold the principal liable even with the right of election.
It should be pointed out that the disclosure need not include the principal's
name, but is sufficient if the third party is put on inquiry.
V DUTY To DISCLOSE vs. DUTY TO INQUIRE.
In speaking of liability of the agent, the authorities say"It is the duty of the agent, if he would avoid personal
liability on a contract entered into by hun on behalf of his principal,
to disclose not only the fact that he is acting in a representative
capacity but also the identity of his prncipal, as the person dealt with
is not bound to inquire whether or not the agent is acting as such
for another." "
At the same time, and in the next breath, in cases where the pnncipal is
seelang to hold the third party liable, we find one authority saying: the third party
"' must be cautious, and not act regardless of the rights
of the principal, though undisclosed, if he has any reasonable grounds
to believe that the party with whom he deals is but an agent. Hence,
if the character of the seller is equivocal; if he is known to be in the
habit of selling sometimes as principal and sometimes as agent
and if the buyer chooses to make no inquiry, and it should turn out
that he has bought of an undisclosed principal, he will be demed the
If by due diligence the buyer should have
benefit of his set-off.
known in what character the seller acted, there would be no justice in
allowing the former to set off a bad debt at the expense of the
principal."'
At first blush, it would appear that there is an inconsistency in the above
"' 2Miller
C. J.v.816.
Lea, 35 Md. 396, 406 (1872).
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rules, but a careful study of the two rules and the results of their application will
serve to remove objection thereto. In the first place, the above rules are applicable to wholly separate and unconnected interests of entirely different mdividuals. Thus the duty is placed upon the third party to inquire for the protection of the partially disclosed or undisclosed principal, rather than for the protection of the agent. It is not only well settled by authority but common sense
dictates that one should not be permitted to disregard the interests of an undisclosed principal and deal with an unscrupulous agent to the principal's detriment,
when he was on notice, actually or constructively, of the agency relationship. In
other words, such notice should be deemed to change an undisclosed agency into
a partially disclosed agency
On the other hand, the duty is placed upon the agent to disclose the agency
for the obvious reason that one should not be permitted to transact business m
his own name and then seek immunity from liability by saying that the contract
is not his. The duty to disclose certainly is not burdensome for the agent. The
agent, from the very beginmig, could relieve humself of all liability by informing
the party with whom he deals of the agency relationship and the identity of the
prmcipal. In fact, if he fails to disclose the agency at all it is reasonable to assume
that he intends to be liable; and the law goes further and requires the disclosure
of the principal's identity, if the agent is to be relieved of liability. This is based
on the theory that the third party is entitled to know the identity of someone
whose credit will stand behind the contract.
These two rules then, considered in the light of their application, are not
only consistent, but are sound in both principle and result.
VI. CONCLUSION: SIGNIFICANCE OF PARTIALLY DISCLOSED AGENCY.

A. As Affects the PrinczparsRights and Liabilities: Partial disclosure of the
agency will cut off defenses and equities existing between the agent and third
party, which the third party might otherwise set up against the principal if the
agency were undisclosed. These would only include claims and set-offs of the
third party against the agent ansing from other transactions. Although the
agency is partially disclosed, the principal will nevertheless be relieved of liability
if the third party elects to pursue the agent. However, the partial disclosure of
the agency does not serve to enhance or reduce the liability of the prncipal, because he may be held liable when discovered whether the agency be fully disclosed, partially disclosed or wholly undisclosed.
B. As Affects the Agent's Rights and Liabilities: Partial disclosure of the
agency has very little, if any, significance as to the agent's liability, since even
though the agency is partially disclosed, the agent may still be held liable if the
third party so elects. If the agent is to avoid liability the agency must be hilly
disclosed.
C. As Affects the Third Party s Interests: Partial disclosure of the agency
will prevent the third party from availing himself of defenses and equities, in a
suit brought by the principal, exsting between the agent and the third party and
arising from other transactions. However, partial disclosure of the agency does
not prevent the third party from electing to hold the agent liable on the contract.
To deprive the third party of this right, the agency must be fully disclosed.
DE~rwMa IsON

